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1921–2008—“Chairman” of the People’s 
Republic of China (1976–1981)
Summary
Hua Guofeng, the handpicked successor 
of Mao Zedong, was relatively unknown 
when he assumed the title of “Chairman” 
in 1976; less than two years later he was 
eclipsed by Deng Xiaoping’s rise. Infor-
mation on his personal life and child-
hood years is scant. His tendency to stay 
behind the scenes is possibly what 
 convinced Mao to appoint him as his 
successor and unifi er of the country. His 
cautious character was likely also one of 
the reasons why he didn’t succeed in 
staying in power for long; he had no real 
allies to sustain him in time of crisis. 
Hua Guofeng was an important name, 
but it was also one that passed from 
celebration into silence in a very short 
time span, doomed to play only a tran-
sitional role.
H ua Guofeng was an exceptional personage in many aspects. During 
the period he was in offi ce, Communist 
Party media portrayed him as a benevo-
lent and reserved leader tinged with an 
aura of sanctity. Political biographies 
written on him both in the 1980s (Ding 
1980) and more recently (Weatherley 
2010) have shown different sides of him. 
According to Robert Weatherley and 
Zhaˉng Pínghuà ᓴᑇ࣪, the Hunan First 
Secretary in 1959 who worked under Hua 
after 1977 in the Central Propa ganda 
Department, Hua was a self-effacing 
leader who did not spurn getting directly 
involved in the projects he was overseeing 
(Weatherley 2010, 73; Zhang 1977, 17–18). 
To others, however, he was a career- 
oriented politician who managed to 
become China’s topmost leader, starting 
from a low provincial-level cadre position 
in the 1960s. What is remarkable is that in 
less than ten years he was able to rise 
from the post of provincial Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) secretary to that of 
Chairman of the Communist Party and 
de facto leader of the country in 1977. 
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to a rich peasant by the name of Liu, 
nicknamed “white monkey” (bái hóuzi 
ⱑ⤈ᄤ) because of his pale complexion. 
While at his side, Hua Yu had an illicit 
liaison with a tenant farmer employed 
by Liu. In 1920 she gave birth to a child, 
Liu Zhengrong, who grew up as Liu’s 
son for a few years. When it was clear 
that he didn’t look like Liu at all, due to 
his dark-skinned complexion, Liu became 
suspicious; a suspicion that quickly 
became reality when he caught Hua Yu 
and her lover, Qin, together. While 
Qin was incarcerated, Hua Yu was able 
to fl ee with her son. They moved around 
for a few years, eventually ending up 
in Taiyuan, Jiaocheng County. There, 
Hua Yu married a Communist under-
ground worker named Hua (given name 
unknown), and from that moment on 
her son’s name was changed to Hua 
Guofeng, which may have been a refer-
ence to resisting Japanese occupation. It 
was common for Communist leaders at 
that time to take on revolutionary names. 
This would indicate that his change of 
names had nothing to do with his newly 
acquired father, and that it happened, in 
fact, much later. 
According to the same “Bombarding 
Hua Guofeng” leafl et, in 1938 Hua Yu 
went to Yan’an and there became inti-
mate with Kaˉng Sheˉng ᒋ⫳, who was in 
charge of secret service and intelligence 
at the time and who later had Hua Yu’s 
husband murdered (Ding 1980, 5; CNA 
1977). It is clear from these events, which 
depict Hua’s mother as a philanderer 
Beginning in 1976, Hua held briefl y the 
three most important positions of China’s 
administrative and political echelons: 
leader of the party, head of state, and 
chief of the Central Military Commission.
Early Life
Hua Guofeng’s childhood years are 
shrouded in mystery. His family’s back-
ground, as well as the identity of his 
father, is still unknown to this day. This 
has prompted speculation that his past is 
being obscured deliberately (Ding 1980, I). 
Two rumors in particular have circulated 
in the past twenty years regarding his 
childhood. The fi rst one, based on a leaf-
let named “Bombarding Hua Guofeng” 
allegedly produced by a pro-Deng Xiaop-
ing faction named “The Spartacus Troops 
of the number 637 Headquarters,” was 
translated into English and published in 
Hong Kong as well as in mainland China 
in 1977. Although it is only an assumption, 
given that the leafl et came from Guang-
zhou (Canton), where *Dèng Xiaˇopíng’s 
䙧ᇣᑇ (1904–1997) military friends were 
based, it is very plausible that these were 
in fact the people responsible for writing 
and distributing the leafl et in an attempt 
to damage Hua’s credentials as chairman, 
favoring Deng. 
According to this publication, Hua 
Guofeng’s mother, Hua Yu, daughter of 
a rich landowner, was sold as a concubine 
*People marked with an asterisk have entries in this 
dictionary.
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already married to Yang Kaihui (his fi rst 
wife). When she found out that he was 
having an affair with a woman by the 
surname of Yao she supposedly reacted 
by demanding that Yao (who died 
shortly after) and the young Hua 
Guofeng be sent to Jiaocheng County, 
near Taiyuan (The Epoch Times 2008). 
According to the same Hong Kong mag-
azine, after Zhou Enlai revealed the truth 
to Hua Guofeng about his origins in 
1966, Hua agreed to keep quiet for Mao’s 
image but decided, in 2001, to withdraw 
from the Chinese Communist Party, 
 citing as an explanation that the Party 
had betrayed the legitimate interests of 
workers and farmers. According to the 
authors of the article, the true reason 
behind this choice was that by doing this 
he could fi nally claim his rightful name 
as the eldest son of Mao Zedong (Asahi 
News 2001 as quoted The Epoch Times 
2008). This version seems to be quite 
unrealistic, however, and an unk nown 
source has recently claimed that the Bei-
jing Hospital is actually in possession of 
DNA material proving that the two (Mao 
and Hua) were not related (BBC 2008; 
NAOL.CA 2008).
During an interview with the British 
Broadcasting Company (BBC) in 1977, 
Hua himself stated quite vaguely that 
after his father’s death, at the age of six, 
he grew up with his mother and elder 
brother in very poor conditions (Weath-
erley 2010, 22). It is quite unusual for a 
CCP leader to be characterized by such a 
lack of personal information. Numerous 
and a promiscuous woman, that this 
source cannot be considered unbiased or 
purely motivated by the urge to inform 
in its description of Hua Guofeng’s early 
years. The information about his mother 
being the daughter of a landowner could 
partly explain, if true, why the Chinese 
Communist authorities were—and still 
are—keen to keep his past well hidden. 
The exact opposite is true for *Máo 
Zédoˉng ↯⋑ϰ (1893–1976) and other offi -
cial leaders, such as *Zhoˉu Eˉnlái ਼ᘽᴹ 
(1898–1976; fi rst Premier of the People’s 
Republic of China), whose childhood 
years have been described and recounted 
in detail by the media.
The second rumor is even more dam-
aging and states that Hua was none 
other than Mao Zedong’s illegitimate 
child born out of wedlock. An unverifi ed 
Internet rumor claims that in 1966, dur-
ing a conversation with Kang Sheng and 
Zhou Enlai Hua discovered his true 
identity and that Mao Zedong was his 
biological father (quoted in Weatherley 
2010, 22).
According to this version, Hua was 
actually born in Hunan Province, as 
Mao’s eldest son, in 1920. (Until recently 
the exact date of his birth was unde-
cided, with some sources stating that it 
was 1920 and others stating 1921; the 
fi nal determination was ironically found 
in the many obituaries published after 
his death in 2008, from which we can 
infer that he was born on 16 February 
1921). At that time Mao was leading 
the local farmers’ movement and was 
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for example, both established their politi-
cal reputation there. In this regard, Hua’s 
experience in Shanxi is atypical in the 
sense that no event of major political or 
professional meaning occurred to him 
while there, nor was he able to build a 
meaningful network of contacts for his 
later career (Weatherley 2010, 21). His 
career was, at best, ordinary, which 
makes his subsequent rise to China’s 
administrative and political top positions 
even more impressive.
It seems that his skills at organizing 
armed resistance led him to quickly 
climb the professional ladder. After 
holding a series of senior posts he soon 
became one of the major CCP cadres of 
the Jiaodong County Committee while 
coordinating anti-Japanese activities at all 
levels (Ding 1980, 17). In 1940 he became 
chairman of the Joint Anti-Japanese 
Association (Kàngrì Jiùguó Liánhéhuì ᡫ
᮹ᬥ೑㘨ড়Ӯ). Hua’s main task con-
sisted in organizing people belonging to 
the association into separate guerilla 
units (mínbıˉng zuˇzhıˉ ⇥݉㒘㒛), who then 
provided assistance to the Eighth Route 
Army (baˉlù juˉn ܿ䏃ݯ), which was the 
larger of the two major Chinese Com-
munist forces that formed a unit of 
the National Revolutionary Army of the 
Republic of China, which fought the 
Japanese from 1937 to 1945. These units 
tried to resist the Japanese campaigns of 
destruction in Shanxi. In 1942 Hua was 
appointed director of the Jiaodong Pro-
paganda Department. Among many other 
tasks, he had to provide sponsorship and 
biographies have been written on famous 
and infamous leaders of the CCP, and 
every detail of their early lives has been 
scrutinized. This has prompted some 
scholars (e.g., Ding and Weatherley) to 
ask themselves whether there was some-
thing in Hua’s past that would be highly 
damaging to his political career, which 
made it best kept unspoken. This would 
explain why even in 2010, two years 
after his death, no additional posthu-
mous detail on his childhood years had 
yet come out (Weatherley 2010, 25).
Early Career
Hua Guofeng was not widely known 
early in his career. While he was gifted in 
military organization, this time in his life 
did not produce a wealth of networking 
in order to work toward climbing the 
political ladder. His low position in 
terms of national status during this time 
makes his later political rise in China 
that much more unusual. 
Hua in Shanxi (1921–1949)
During the 1940s, Hua was a young 
guerilla fi ghter in the operations against 
the Japanese in Jiaodong County, Shanxi. 
Shanxi is a province of symbolic impor-
tance for the generation of Chinese 
Communist Party leaders who were in 
power after the founding of the People’s 
Republic in 1949. Deng Xiaoping and 
*Péng Déhuái ᕁᖋᗔ (1898–1974, military 
leader of the Chinese Communist Party), 
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rise. Hua became known to Mao Zedong 
during this time and began gaining his 
trust consistently showing unfailing 
support of Mao’s ideas. This ultimately 
led to Mao’s endorsement of Hua to 
become his successor. 
Hua left Shanxi in 1949 and went 
fi rst to Hebei for a one-month training. 
After that, as part of a Southbound Work 
Group (Nánxià goˉngzuòtuán फϟᎹ԰ಶ), 
he moved to Hunan where he would 
remain for twenty-two years, the most 
important years of his political career 
before becoming party chairman in 1976. 
He fi rst settled in Xiangyin, where he 
soon became party secretary and a politi-
cal commissar of the County Armed 
Forces Department. In June 1951, he was 
transferred from Xiangyin to Xiangtan 
County where he took up a list of offi cial 
assignments from secretary of the county’s 
CCP Committee, to political commissar 
of the county’s People’s Armed Force 
Department. Even though the transfer in 
itself was not a promotion, by working 
in Mao Zedong’s home province he was 
able to attract Mao’s attention, an event 
that most probably had a direct correla-
tion in Hua being, years later, hand-
picked by Mao himself to be his successor. 
In Xiangtan, Hua became deputy party 
secretary of the Xiangtan Prefecture and 
was then promoted full party secretary 
in 1953. This promotion marked the 
moment in his career when he rose from 
a middle-cadre position (zhoˉngjí gànbù 
Ё㑻ᑆ䚼) to a high-level cadre position 
(gaˉojí gànbù 催㑻ᑆ䚼).
ideas to Communist theatrical troupes 
from the area. In the course of the three 
years (1942–1945) he served in this 
capacity, he came to be involved and 
infl uential in the activities of the Village 
Drama Movement (Nóngcuˉn xìjù yùndòng 
ݰᴥ៣࠻䖤ࡼ).
There has been debate regarding his 
role during the Civil War period, and dur-
ing the land reform era that came later. 
According to author Ding Wang, Hua 
 distinguished himself for his ability and 
ruthlessness in suppressing landlords and 
middle peasants, becoming “notorious for 
being brutal and relentless” while confi s-
cating properties (Ding1980, 25). Weath-
erley aptly points out, however, that 
while it may very well have been so, in 
the absence of irrefutable proofs we sim-
ply cannot be sure (Weatherley 2010, 41).
During the ten years he spent in 
Shanxi, Hua became an expert of guerrilla 
and intelligence networks but again, the 
peculiarity of this period is its insignifi -
cance in terms of contacts and profes-
sional experiences that Hua was able to 
build while in Jiaodong. In other words, 
at least during his Shanxi period, he was a 
gifted and capable local cadre, well known 
at the local level but still utterly unknown 
at the national level. (See the sidebar on 
page 1437 of this volume for details on the 
Communist Party’s cadre system.)
Hua in Hunan (1949–1971)
It was when Hua left Shanxi toward 
Hunan that his political career began to 
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years when he was in power, increase the 
popularized image portrayed by the media 
of a gifted and pragmatic problem-solver.
The Post-Leap Recovery Period 
(1958–1965)
In 1958, after fi lling in a number of posts 
dealing with culture and education, 
Hua shifted his interests to the economy 
and construction sectors. In July of the 
same year he became vice-governor of 
Hunan Province, and in September he 
was also named alternate secretary of 
the Hunan Provincial CCP Committee, 
becoming one of the leading members of 
the committee’s economic department. 
For the fi rst time, since his arrival in 
Hunan, he started chairing and heading 
a number of bodies responsible for eco-
nomical planning.
In the early 1960s, his political career 
suffered a setback and he was “sent down” 
by being assigned to a lower level of party 
hierarchy. To be more precise, he was 
sent back to Xiangtan where, due to his 
extensive knowledge of the area, he was 
supposed to remedy the innumerable 
pro blems provoked by Mao’s Great Leap 
Forward (Dàyuè jìn ໻䎗䖯) and assist in 
the local recovery program. (The Great 
Leap Forward was a campaign aimed at 
advancing China’s agricultural and 
industrial development to the level of 
the West through the promotion of peo-
ple’s communes, and by encouraging 
the rural workforce to smelt iron in back-
yard furnaces, among other ill-advised 
During the rural collectivization 
period, in which land cooperatives were 
formed, Hua busied himself particularly 
with those mutual assistance groups (or 
mutual aid teams) that were established 
in Shaoshan, Mao’s birthplace; there is 
speculation that, willingly or by chance, 
this earned him Mao’s attention and 
trust (Ding 1980, 41; Weatherley 2010, 5). 
So during the seven years he spent in 
Xiangtang Prefecture, he became a com-
petent party secretary with good organi-
zational skills, in-depth knowledge of 
propaganda techniques, and a high level 
of education.
Hua was always quite committed to 
Mao’s revolutionary ideas and, especially 
regarding the collectivization period, 
embraced enthusiastically every policy 
coming from Mao that called for an 
acceleration of the process. This was an 
attitude that made him quite unpopular 
among his immediate local superiors, 
who had lukewarm reactions toward the 
rapid pace of rural collectivization.
In May of 1956 he was transferred from 
Xiangtan to the Hunan provincial People’s 
Council in Changsha where he took up the 
position of chief of the Culture and Edu-
cation Offi ce (ZGHW 1977, 21) and, at the 
same time, became secretary of the local 
CCP section. This was the fi rst step in his 
career as a party and government cadre at 
the provincial level. Those were the years 
when he consolidated his previously 
acquired skills (Shanxi warfare units) in 
organizing and coordinating activities at 
various levels, which would then, in the 
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renovation of Mao Zedong’s old school 
and the construction of a display hall. 
This has prompted speculation, among 
some scholars, that he had ulterior 
motives (namely ingratiating himself to 
Mao) for taking up these projects (Weath-
erley 2010, 7; Ding 1980, 72). Between 
1965 and 1966 he was also assigned to 
the foreign policy realm and, specifi cally, 
to oversee war preparation in case of an 
escalation in the Vietnam War and a pos-
sible Chinese involvement in the war.
The Beijing Period 
(1971–1981)
By the early 1970s, Hua had become 
fi rst secretary of the Hunan Provincial 
Party Committee and political commissar 
of the Canton Military Region. At this 
point, he moved to Beijing, probably in 
September of 1971. At the national level, 
Hua Guofeng had already become a 
fairly important member of the State 
Council by 1971, ranking as high as vice-
premier. These promotions had hap-
pened largely due to the institutional 
void left by the “Red Guard purges” in 
the political echelons of Hunan Province. 
Thanks to his technical expertise, he was 
able to put his capabilities to good use at 
the State Council. One of his main tasks 
was assisting Zhou Enlai in his daily 
duties. In 1973 he was promoted to the 
Politburo while continuing to work in 
the State Council as vice-premier, and 
two years later, in 1975, he became 
minister of public security. Offi cially, 
schemes.) This was a diffi cult moment 
for Hua, in part because of the profes-
sional setback but also because, being a 
fervent supporter of Mao’s agricultural 
communes, he was opposed to some of 
the measures introduced in order to sal-
vage the economy, such as “fi xing pro-
duction quotas on the household basis.” 
Weatherley notes, however, that Hua 
was not as slavish toward Mao or to the 
offi cial party line (Weatherley 2010, 70) 
as he is often portrayed to be both in the 
offi cial literature (for obvious reasons) and 
in the scholarly literature (Ding 1980, 50; 
Oksenberg and Yeung 1977, 13, 15). We 
fi nd evidence of this in his taking a 
critical position against the “unrealistic 
output targets” set by certain offi cials 
during the Great Leap Forward’s initial 
phase and in his taking Mao’s side on 
rural collectivization even when, ini-
tially, it seemed that a more cautious 
approach would prevail. 
According to Ding, in the summer 
of 1964 Hua was transferred back to 
Changsha, albeit with an extension of 
his duties and competences to areas like 
culture, education, agriculture, propa-
ganda, fi nance, and trade (Ding 1980, 65; 
Oksenberg and Yeung 1977, 46). After 
1965 he became mainly responsible for 
farm work and for the Shaoshan irriga-
tion plant, a project that contributed to 
making him well known around the 
country and increased his political pres-
tige in spreading the idea of Hua as a 
capable and skilled organizer of man-
power. While there, he also oversaw the 
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to Hua by taking up the leadership of the 
Academy of Sciences.
A particularly eventful year in the 
history of the People’s Republic of China 
was 1976. Not only is this the year in 
which three of the country’s most infl u-
ential leaders (Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, 
and *Zhuˉ Dé  ᴅᖋ) passed away, but a 
series of events like the Tangshan earth-
quake in July and the Tiananmen inci-
dent in April—the latter triggered by the 
death of Zhou Enlai four months before, 
and not to be confused with the Tianan-
men Square protests of 1989—generated 
social disturbance among the people 
that further aggravated the economic 
crisis of China. At the same time a deli-
cate political battle was raging between 
the two most infl uential factions of China’s 
political echelons: that of Mao’s last wife, 
*Jiaˉng Qıˉng ∳䴦 (1914–1991) and the 
Gang of Four with their radical ideas, 
and that of the “bureaucrats,” among 
whom were the late Zhou Enlai, Lıˇ 
Xiaˉnniàn ᴢܜᗉ, Deng Xiaoping, and 
many others. Among the numerous 
struggles between different political fac-
tions, Hua was fortunate enough to be 
able to steer himself from one side (the 
more radical one being that of the Gang 
of Four) to the other without getting 
burned. If Mao had originally planned to 
have his wife and three of her associates, 
Wáng Hóngwén ⥟⋾᭛, Yáo Wényuán 
ྮ᭛ܗ, and Zhaˉng Chuˉnqiáo ᓴ᯹ḹ, 
succeed him, his aims didn’t take into 
account the strong reactions from the 
bureaucrats and from the military leaders. 
though, recognition that he was acting 
as vice-premier came only in 1975 at 
the fi rst meeting of the Fifth National 
People’s Congress (NPC) to reorganize 
the State Council. At the time it was in 
fact a common practice to be assigned 
to a certain post without a previous 
offi cial announcement.
Around the year 1975 the struggle 
for the leadership in the highest echelons 
of the CCP became fi ercer than ever. The 
two politicians who had dominated the 
Cultural Revolution decade (1966–1976), 
Chén Bódá 䰜ԃ䖒 (1904–1989) and *Lín 
Biaˉo ᵫᔾ (1907–1971) (Mao’s chosen suc-
cessor), were removed by Mao after 
the latter plotted against him and the 
party. (Offi cially called the “Great Prole-
tarian Cultural Revolution,” this was a 
complex socio-political mass movement 
that urged people—especially young 
people—to rebel against traditional, capi-
talist, and so-called backwards cultural 
elements in Chinese society; this radical-
ization, spurred on by Mao Zedong, 
caused massive social, political, and cul-
tural disruptions, killing and injuring 
many Chinese people.) In 1975, follow-
ing the Fifth National People’s Congress, 
Deng Xiaoping became responsible for 
the reorganization of the party appara-
tus; Hua was vice-premier in charge of 
science and technology (an assignment 
that brought him very close to Deng, at 
the time unoffi cially in charge of the 
country), while future National Party 
leader Hú Yàobaˉng 㚵㗔䙺 (1915–1989) 
took over the role that previously belonged 
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was removed, Hua became fi rst vice 
chairman of the party and then premier 
of the State Council in April of that same 
year. The decision to remove Deng and 
promote Hua came from Mao (through 
the words of his nephew and, at the time, 
sole confi dant, Máo Yuaˇnxıˉn ↯䖰ᮄ), but 
the decision was then made offi cial by 
the Politburo, although through an 
unconstitutional process. 
Hua was actually appointed as act-
ing premier, the fi rst time such a position 
was being used in China, suggesting that 
the time was not ripe yet to make him 
full premier, which could be done only 
after a meeting of the National People’s 
Congress. As observed both by Weath-
erly (127) and MacFarquhar (1997, 298fn) 
when Hua fi nally became full premier, in 
October of 1976, he became so in absence 
of any constitutional process (suggesting 
no meeting by the NPC had actually 
taken place). Hua consistently tried to 
keep himself in a political middle posi-
tion, cautious not to counter Mao’s will, 
but also careful not to clash with the 
“bureaucrats” faction by refraining to 
attack them unnecessarily. According to 
Ding Wang, at the time Hua was ascribed 
to the Third Force Group ㄀ϝ࢓࡯, a 
group defi ned by the Chinese media as 
“the wind faction” because its members 
opportunistically switched sides when 
convenient (Ding 1980, 108).
Another hypothesis is that Hua 
was actually a kind of symbolic fi gure 
elected by General Yè Jiànyıˉng ৊ࠥ㣅 
(1897–1986), who acted as Hua’s kingmaker, 
Hua Guofeng was thus most probably 
picked as a compromise leader and 
appointed as acting premier. Ding Wang 
seems to suggest that Hua Guofeng was 
never actually meant to be Mao Zedong’s 
successor. He claims that when Mao had 
previously nominated Lin Biao as his 
rightful heir, everyone was aware of it 
and no one dared to attack Lin Biao. But 
with Hua everything was different; not 
only was he constantly attacked by the 
Gang of Four, but he was also never pub-
licly named by Mao, even though he 
claimed he was (Ding 1980, 126). He 
seems to have been a choice of compro-
mise on the part of Mao who, being 
unable to elect one of his more radical 
acolytes due to the resistance of the party 
veterans, opted for Hua instead. Having 
served as fi rst provincial party secretary 
and having been in charge of various 
important sectors while living in Hunan, 
he had signifi cant credentials that were 
not easy to discredit. He had moderate 
political views, which were for the most 
part unknown to the majority of the peo-
ple, and was thus an acceptable choice 
both for the party elders and for Mao as 
someone who was easy to control and 
gets things done. This could also explain 
why, at fi rst, he was only nominated as 
acting premier and not full premier, being, 
in fact, a compromise fi gure.
On 3 February 1976, Hua was named 
acting premier by the CCP Central Com-
mittee. After Zhou Enlai’s death, Mao 
launched a campaign to purge Deng, in 
which Hua also took part. Once Deng 
www.berkshirepublishing.com       © 2014 Berkshire Publishing grouP, all rights reserved.
•
 H
uá G
uófeˉng •
• People’s Republic of China (Part I) • 1949–1979 •
• 1425 •
1976, Hua became chairman of the CCP, 
a place that had been vacant since Mao’s 
death on 9 September, and of the Central 
Military Commission. In this way, all of 
the party and government positions had 
been assigned to Hua following offi cial 
procedures. Hua was effectively China’s 
most dominant leader. The legitimacy of 
his post was stated at the third plenum 
of the Tenth CCP Congress in July of 
1977. In March of 1978, the National 
People’s Congress met for its annual 
session and elected Hua as premier. 
Experts claim that his rise from obscu-
rity to notoriety started in 1973, the year 
in which he was elected to the  Politburo, 
a post that later enabled him to play a 
leading role in overthrowing the Gang 
of Four.
At his fi rst NPC meeting, Hua 
Guofeng proposed four tasks in his fi rst 
famous long speech (published on 28 
December 1977) at the “Second National 
Conference Learning from Dazhai in 
Agriculture” (Chi 1977, 94). This speech 
sparked a great deal of interest at the 
time, which was visible in the great pop-
ularity that its topics enjoyed among the 
public, who discussed the problems 
addressed in it on the streets or at home. 
The fi rst task proposed for 1977 was to 
“Deeply develop the great mass move-
ment to criticize the Gang of Four.” The 
second was “Strengthening Party Build-
ing,” which set out from the idea that to 
regain legitimacy, the party fi rst had to 
reestablish the correct order wrecked by 
the Gang of Four. The third main task 
promoting him in order to discredit 
and dismantle the radical elements of 
the Gang of Four. At any rate, even 
when Hua Guofeng became full premier, 
he did so without a formal appoint-
ment and in the absence of a formal 
procedure, a fact that Deng Xiaoping 
later sought to exploit in order to dis-
qualify him.
Hua as Chairman (1976–1981)
After Mao’s death in September of 1976, 
the political scene was still dominated 
by two opposing factions trying to seize 
power. Mao’s testament, dated 1976, 
consisted of three notes, of which the 
most famous one, meant for Hua Guofeng, 
said: “With you in charge, I’m at ease” (Nıˇ 
bàn shì, woˇ fàng xıˉn Դࡲџ៥ᬒᖗ). This 
ensured that Hua eventually ended up 
victorious in the struggle for power with 
Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four. It is fair 
to say, though, that there has been a dis-
pute regarding whether Mao really 
wrote this note or not, since Hua did not 
actually release it until after the arrest of 
the Gang of Four members. He is in fact 
the one who facilitated the coup d’état in 
which the members of the Gang of Four 
were purged.
A mixture of elements probably 
prompted Mao to choose Hua as his suc-
cessor: his loyalty to him, his skills as 
administrator and organizer, his unify-
ing fi gure, and also the fact that there 
were no other credible alternatives 
(Weatherley 2010, 135). On 7 October 
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peculiar shift in the upper echelons of 
China’s politics occurred: Hua was offi -
cially in power but Deng was the real de 
facto head of the country. After the arrest 
of the Gang of Four, and Deng Xiaoping’s 
consequent return, Hua relinquished 
political control at the Third Plenum of 
the Eleventh Central Committee in 1978. 
Offi cially, though, he remained in power 
until 1981 when he was formally 
removed from each of his three political 
posts. He remained a member of the 
Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) 
and the Politburo until 1982, even though 
his chairman period was over in 1981. 
The main motivations for his relinquish-
ing power to Deng Xiaoping’s men were 
linked to popular protests and discon-
tent developing in rural and urban areas 
regarding the economic and social con-
ditions of the masses. The national econ-
omy was in very poor condition due to 
several factors, such as the production 
sabotage operated by the Gang of Four, 
the 1976 Tangshan earthquake, and 
above all other reasons the havoc and 
destruction caused by the Cultural Rev-
olution (Chi 1977, 34). The dire situation 
increasingly worried the military, which 
realized the need for stability after the 
tumultuous years of the Cultural Revo-
lution. This stability was more likely to 
be brought about by Deng, who had 
many supporters both among the military 
echelons and the Politburo, as well as 
among the people, who saw him closely 
connected to the greatly missed Zhou 
Enlai (Weatherley 2010, 144).
was “to strive to push national economy 
forward,” which was the task that most 
satisfi ed the wish of the people after the 
disasters brought about by the Cultural 
Revolution and the damages of the Gang 
of Four. The fourth main task proposed 
in the speech was to study Mao’s work 
and Marxist-Leninist works. It seems that 
in trying to legitimize his position by 
associating himself closely to Mao, Hua 
made a mistake in choosing a path that 
was considered too radical by voicing his 
fervent hopes that many more Cultural 
Revolutions were awaiting in the future.
One of his newly coined mottos 
was the “two whatevers” (liaˇng ge fánshì 
ϸϾ޵ᰃ) policy, which embodied his 
utmost loyalty toward Mao: “Whatever 
policy chairman Mao decided upon, 
we shall resolutely defend; whatever 
directives Chairman Mao issued, we shall 
steadfastly obey (޵ᰃ↯Џᐁ԰ߎⱘއㄪ, 
៥Ӏ䛑മއ㓈ᡸ; ޵ᰃ↯Џᐁⱘᣛ⼎, ៥Ӏ
䛑ྟ㒜ϡ⏱ഄ䙉ᕾ).” He also tried to 
establish a “Hua Guofeng’s cult” after 
Mao’s death through the publication, in 
the offi cial party media, of numerous 
articles depicting his accomplishments 
and values. If Mao was known as the 
“great teacher” (weˇidà daˇoshıˉ ӳ໻ᇐᏜ), 
Hua became the “wise leader” (yıˉngmíng 
lıˇngxiù 㣅ᯢ乚㹪). These measures were 
aimed at reinforcing Hua’s legitimacy to 
inherit Mao’s role as chairman (Ye 1998, 
172–175).
Although Hua Guofeng’s rise to 
power was remarkable, his descent was 
even more so. From 1977 onward a 
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His tendency to stay “behind the 
scenes” is possibly what convinced Mao 
to appoint him as his successor and uni-
fi er of the country. On the other hand, his 
cautious character was most probably 
also one of the reasons why he didn’t 
succeed in keeping the power for very 
long; never fully part of either group, he 
had no real allies to sustain him in time 
of crisis. His strengths were his intimate 
knowledge of basic and mid-level organi-
zational structure, his ties to the security 
apparatus, and his managerial abilities in 
water conservancy issues, among others. 
His weaknesses derived mainly from 
his scarce knowledge of the international 
scene and the small group of supporters 
among the Chinese political elitè. This, 
coupled with the fact that he failed to 
distinguish himself politically, made his 
brief rule an exceptional parenthesis in 
the procession of Chinese politics.
Simona A. GRANO
Institute of Asian and Oriental Studies, 
University of Zurich
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